The process aimed at discovering new ideas is an economic activity whose returns are intrinsically uncertain. In a standard neo-Schumpeterian growth framework we assume that, when deciding upon R&D e¤orts, economic agents hold 'ambiguous beliefs' about the exact probability of arrival of the next vertical innovations, and face ambiguity via the MEU decision rule (Ghirardato et al. (2004)). Along the steady-state equilibrium the higher the agents'ambiguity aversion ( ), the lower the R&D e¤orts and, coeteris paribus, the overall economic performance. Consistently with a cross-country empirical evidence, this causal mechanism suggests that, together with the pro…tability conditions of the economy, di¤erent 'cultural'attitudes towards ambiguity may contribute to explain the di¤erent R&D intensities observed across countries.
Introduction
Investment decisions in R&D are mostly taken under conditions of strong uncertainty (Knight, 1921 ) on their expected returns: Innovations are in fact unique events, and the process aimed at producing them is -both by logic and by historical inspectionan intrinsically uncertain economic activity. In the words of Nathan Rosenberg (1994, p. 93 ) "the essential feature of technological innovation is that it is an activity that is fraught with many uncertainties. This uncertainty, by which I mean an inability to predict the outcome of the search process, or to predetermine the most e¢ cient path to some particular goal, has a very important implication: the activity cannot be planned". The importance of uncertainty in R&D decision-making is also largely con…rmed by the empirical evidence on …rm behavior 1 . If uncertainty pervades the decision setting for R&D investments, then the economic agents'attitude towards uncertainty is crucial to understand in more depth the nature and the characteristics of the innovation process.
Strong uncertainty plays no role in innovation-driven growth theory. The assumption of a perfectly assessable investment horizon -that is, the idea that transparent and well-organized …nancial markets allow savers to …nance R&D activity in the light of an expected discounted value of future returns 'revealed'by an e¢ cient stock market -is in fact standard along such models as Romer (1990) , Aghion and Howitt (1992) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and subsequent developments. In particular, in Schumpeterian growth theory (SGT) the Schumpeter's view of economic development, as spurred by incessant R&D races aimed at gaining monopoly pro…ts, is incorporated into an Arrow-Debreu dynamic general equilibrium framework with 'measurable uncertainty'(risk).
In SGT the arrival of innovation in the economy is usually formalized via a Poisson process. The parameter of this process, representing the ' ‡ow probability'of innovation, is constant and perfectly known by R&D …rms. In particular, in the original framework developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992) , the value of this parameter ( ), a¤ects both the problem of whether or not to invest in R&D (whose solution is embodied by the 'arbitrage equation'), and the problem of whether to invest in risk-free assets or in shares of monopolistic …rms (whose solution is embodied by the 'asset equation').
In this framework we remove the assumption of a 'rigorously calculable future', and provide a …rst attempt to formally introduce strong uncertainty (or, as we will see, ambiguity) in the process describing the evolution of innovation. In particular, we allow for the 'true' ‡ow probability of innovation t to change over time and consider the existence of investors holding 'ambiguous beliefs' about the exact value of that probability. We refound the basic Schumpeterian framework in the light of this new assumption, and consider the representative agent facing the two decision problems recalled above via the MEU decision rule (Hurwicz (1951) , Ghirardato et al. (2004) ).
In the steady-state equilibrium the amount of resources devoted to R&D, and hence the expected balanced growth path, crucially depend upon the way agents face the ambiguity in the arrival of innovation. In particular, the higher the ambiguity aversion of the representative agent (as measured by the coe¢ cient ), the lower the equilibrium R&D e¤orts.
We propose a "cultural intepretation"of the causal mechanism -going from ambiguity attitude to R&D investments -highlighted in the paper. If we interpret the attitude towards uncertainty as a country-speci…c cutural trait -as Hofstede (2001) This paper aims at extending a standard Schumpeterian framework in order to account for the lack of information characterizing the returns on R&D investments. On the one hand, in proving the robustness of this theoretical framework to the investors' strong uncertainty, it can be interpreted as an attempt to overcome the concern expressed by Rosenberg (1994, p . 93) -namely that "the activity cannot be planned" -through the theory of decision-making under ambiguity. On the other hand, and consistently with the empirical evidence shown in the next Section, the mechanism theoretically highlighted in it suggests that, together with the pro…tability conditions of the R&D sectors, di¤erent cultural attitudes towards uncertainty across countries may contribute to explain the di¤erences in the R&D intensities observed among them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we show the empirical evidence on the relationship between a measure of tolerance towards uncertainty and R&D investments. In Section 3 we brie ‡y recall the two concepts of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. In Section 4 we provide a reminder of the simplest Schumpeterian framework, which we then use in Section 5 to determine the steady-state equilibrium
Empirical Evidence
Consistently with the causal mechanism highlighted in the model we observe, across Another recent empirical contribution along these lines is Huang (2006) , who shows that the di¤erent levels of tolerance towards ambiguity across countries, as measured by UAI, are responsible for the di¤erent growth rates that we observe in the most innovative industrial sectors of these countries: the empirical analysis suggests that these sectors, usually characterized by relatively more 'informational opacity'(that is, by more vague information about their returns), grow much more slowly (rapidly) in countries with relatively higher (lower) levels of UAI. This conclusion indirectly supports our claim that R&D employment, reasonably associated with the most innovative sectors of the economy, is negatively a¤ected by ambiguity aversion. 2 Across European countries the negative correlation is even stronger. 3 The UAI is a broad measure of the country-speci…c cultural attitude towards uncertainty, built by interviewing 88000 IBM employees across more than 70 countries. See the appendix for a detailed description of the index, and for the connection between this index and ambiguity aversion.
Ambiguity and Ambiguity Attitude
Ambiguity is to be intended in the sense that, given a typical uncertain choice scenario, the decision maker's (DM) information about feasible states of nature is too vague to be represented by a -single, additive -probability measure. Ambiguity attitude refers to the DM's reaction in the face of that ambiguity: that reaction can in fact be of either aversion or attraction (and, of course, of di¤erent degrees of either of them) to the ambiguity the DM perceives. Ellsberg (1961) was the …rst one to show, through a mind experiment (known as the Ellsberg Paradox 4 ), the incompatibility between a 'reasonable'and widespread choice in his experiment and the one dictated by the SEU principle (Savage (1954)), which represents the standard treatment of decision making under uncertainty in economics.
The paradox emphasizes that people tend to make a distinction between clear (objective) probabilities and vague (subjective) probabilities, an argument which reminds of the old Keynesian distinction between 'probability'and 'weight of evidence' 5 (Keynes (1921) ). Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) Although CEU and MEU have given an operational meaning to the concepts of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, they have encountered problems in providing a clear distinction between them. One way to (partially) overcome these problems has been recently taken in a multiple-prior setting by Ghirardato et al. (2004) 6 . In particular, we follow a special case axiomatized in it called MEU decision rule. This rule is 4 The two-urn version of the experiment goes as follows: two urns are given, each of which contains ten balls, whose color is either white or black. One of them is known to contain …ve white balls and …ve black balls, while no information is given on the distribution of the balls'colors in the other urn. The decision maker is asked to bet on the color of the …rst ball drawn at random from either urn, and must decide which urn she prefers. The paradox arises whenever people show a preference for the 'known'urn, that is, for the urn containing …ve white and …ve black balls. This choice behavior cannot be explained by the subjective expected utility (SEU) principle, since there is no subjective (additive) probability distribution that supports these preferences. 5 The 'probability'represents the balance of evidence in favor of a particular proposition, while the 'weight of evidence'stands for the quantity of information supporting that balance. 6 For a discussion of the limits of this approach see Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) .
an extension of the Hurwicz's (1951) pessimism index criterion, which computes a weighted sum (for 2 [0; 1]) of the maxmin expected utility (obtained via the selection of the worst prior) and the maxmax expected utility (obtained via the selection of the best prior). In the MEU the ambiguity perceived by the DM is measured by the extension of priors, while the ambiguity aversion is (positively) measured by the coe¢ cient (the higher it is, the higher is the weight associated with the worst case). The MEU is of course a particular case of the MEU in which = 1 (that is, in which ambiguity aversion is at its maximum). Given a utility function u, a set of priors and a state space S with s 2 S, the evaluation of act f is made according to the following functional:
)dp(s):
The neo-Schumpeterian Framework
We now brie ‡y recall the basic framework developed in Aghion and Howitt (1992) .
Time is continuous and there exists a continuum of in…nitely lived households with identical intertemporally additive preferences, with r representing the rate of time preference. Since instantaneous utility is assumed to be linear and there are perfect capital markets, then r also turns out to be the equilibrium interest rate. Households are endowed with ‡ow units of skilled or unskilled labor time and are assumed to supply them inelastically in a perfectly competitive market.
There is a perfectly competitive …nal sector, in which output is produced according to a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology. For simplicity, we assume a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation:
where y is …nal output, x is the intermediate good and N , normalized to 1, is the unskilled labor. A is the productivity parameter, which is assumed to evolve according to the following rule:
A t+1 = A t for > 1 and t = 0; 1; 2::: the assumption that innovations are drastic, monopoly pro…ts can be easily obtained from the pro…t maximizing condition:
where w t is the skilled labor wage. This maximization gives the optimal value of x t as
Maximum pro…ts can then be written as t = 1
x t w t :
The innovation process takes place because R&D …rms employ, in a perfectly competitive market, an amount n of skilled labor in order to gain a probability of discovering the next vintage. Since skilled labor can switch from the research sector to the intermediate sector and viceversa, the skilled labor market clearing condition can be written as
where x t and n t represent labor employed respectively in the intermediate and the research sectors. We also de…ne V t as the market value of the monopolistic …rm producing vintage t.
According to the standard Schumpeterian literature, the arrival of innovation in the economy is assumed to follow a Poisson Process. The parameter of this process, representing the ‡ow probability of an innovation, is constant and known by the investor.
Because of CRS in the research sector, the number of R&D …rms is indeterminate. In equilibrium expected bene…ts from a unit of R&D e¤ort ( V t+1 ) must equal its cost (w t ). The equation
is usually called the 'research arbitrage equation'of the model. Furthermore, because instantaneous utilities are linear, agents must be indi¤erent between investing in shares of the incumbents and investing in risk-free assets. Then the value V t+1 must satisfy the following 'asset equation':
where rV t+1 is the return from investing in risk-free shares, t+1 is the ‡ow of pro…ts corresponding to vintage t + 1, while n t+1 V t+1 is the expected capital loss due to the introduction of vintage t + 2, and embodies the Schumpeter's 'creative destruction e¤ect'associated with innovation. The asset equation gives the expression for V t+1 as
stating that the market value of the monopolistic …rm producing vintage t + 1 is the ‡ow of pro…ts that it will produce, discounted at the obsolescence-adjusted interest rate 7 . We are now ready to modify this basic set-up so as to incorporate the agents' ignorance about the arrival rate of innovation.
Equilibrium R&D E¤orts under Ambiguity
For each vintage t agents hold 'ambiguous beliefs'about the true ' ‡ow probability of innovation' t . We assume that, for each t, investors believe that takes a strictly positive …nite value, that is to say: The width of the interval -e.g., the extension of priors -is a measure of the ambiguity perceived by the agents. Furthermore, in our setting agents have no possibility of im- 7 Notice that the appearing in (2) and the one appearing in (3) are ldistinct, since they refer to the productivity of R&D in discovering respectively vintages t + 1 and t + 2. It follows that the structure of this class of models imposes that, when deciding upon R&D activity in t, investors know the exact probabilities ( ) of the next two vertical innovations. Of course in the standard model this is easily satisifed because is assumed constant. 8 This assumption is meant to exclude the uninteresting cases in which the agent is either totally hopeless about the possibility of innovating ( t = 0), or absolutely sure of producing an innovation in the exact instant in which he invests ( t ! +1).
proving their knowledge upon the parameter via a 'learning process', since innovations are unique events -the probability distribution changes from an innovation to another -and, hence, there is no statistical basis for embarking on calculations.
In the light of this assumption on the agents'beliefs, two decision problems stated in Section 4 must be reconsidered. The former is the problem of whether or not to devote investments to R&D and the latter is the problem of whether to invest in shares of the incumbents or in risk-free assets. We will study them in order under the decision rule introduced in Section 3.
Problem 1 (The Research Arbitrage Equation)
Assume that the economy is in t (that is, assume that generation t of the intermediate good is being produced). Under ambiguous beliefs about the value taken by t (which, notice, represents the probability of discovering vintage t + 1), the R&D …rm has to decide whether or not to hire workers in R&D by comparing the pro…tability associated with these two alternatives. If the …rm does not hire any R&D worker, its return will always be null, independently of the true value of t . If it does, the cost of each R&D investment unit is the skilled labor wage (w t ), while expected bene…ts ( t V t+1 ) depend on the strictly uncertain probability t 2 [m; M ]: the return from R&D investment will then be t V t+1 w t for t 2 [m; M ].
Given this decision problem, the DM -R&D …rm -adopting the MEU decision rule evaluates her expected returns from R&D by computing a -weighted average of the maxmin level (also called 'security level', mV t+1 w t ) and the maxmax level
where 0 1 is a parameter measuring the aversion to ambiguity. By comparing this pay-o¤ with the null pay-o¤ associated with 'no R&D investment', indi¤erence as to whether or not to invest in R&D can then be expressed via the following arbitrage equation 9 :
Problem 2 (The Market Value of Incumbents)
What is the market value of the monopolistic …rm producing generation t + 1 of the intermediate good (V t+1 )? In order to derive its expression, we need to address the agent's problem (in t + 1) of whether to invest in risk-free assets or in shares of current monopolists in the light of the strict uncertainty associated with the parameter t+1 .
There are two possible acts, investing in risk-free assets or in shares of the monopolistic …rms: if the investor decides to buy risk-free assets, her return will always be rV t+1 , independently of the productivity of the research technology. On the other hand, if she invests in shares of the incumbents, then her pay-o¤ will be t+1 t+1 n t+1 V t+1 , where now t+1 represents the productivity of the R&D aimed at discovering vintage t + 2: the risky asset return is then a decreasing function of t+1 .
For an MEU decision maker the return associated with investing in shares is given by the -weighted average of the maxmin level ( t+1 M n t+1 V t+1 ) and the maxmax level 10 ( t+1 mn t+1 V t+1 ), while the one corresponding to investing in riskfree assets is always rV t+1 . Indi¤erence as to whether to invest in shares or in riskfree assets is reached when these values equalize 11 . Then in equilibrium it must be rV t+1 = t+1 [ M + (1 )m]n t+1 V t+1 and hence 12
The Steady-State Equilibrium
In steady-state the monopolistic pro…ts in t + 1 are
By substituting that value into (5) and (5) into (4) we easily obtain the …nal expression for the arbitrage equation, which, together with the labor market-clearing condition, form the system describing the evolution of this economy:
By imposing n t = n t+1 , we can rewrite this system as 8 > < > :
from which we can easily determine the equilibrium value of the research e¤ort 13
It is easy to prove that @n @ < 0, which means that the mass of workers employed in The e¤ect of the ambiguity attitude has instead already been recalled above: an increase in ambiguity aversion has a negative impact on R&D e¤orts (@n =@ < 0), which means that an economy with a scarse tolerance of ambiguity will invest relatively little in R&D and, given the key-role of R&D for economic growth, will coeteris paribus lag behind another economy with a more positive attitude towards ambiguity.
Welfare Analysis
In this Section we compare the laissez-faire equilibrium R&D e¤ort n with the one chosen by a social planner seeking to maximize the welfare of the representative agent n sp . Such welfare, called U t , is the valuation, based on the risk-free rate of time preference r, of the consumption available at all future dates. The reasoning underlying the derivation of U t closely resembles the one carried out to derive V t in (3), with two important di¤erences: …rst, as the reader recalls from Section 3 where we determined the market value of the monopolistic …rm, the shareholders are only interested in the ‡ow of pro…ts ( t ); in contrast, here consumers care about the current expected value of their entire consumption prospect (given by the …nal product y t , as a sum of both wages and pro…ts). U t can actually be interpreted as the value of an asset which gives to the owner the right to receive, as a return, the whole national income. Second, in deriving (3) we saw that the arrival of the next innovation exercises a negative e¤ect on the market value of the incumbent (because of its 'creative destruction' e¤ect).
Conversely, from a social perspective the arrival of the successive innovation enhances unambiguously the consumers'welfare, which jumps to U t+1 = U t , with a net collective gain equal to U t+1 U t = ( 1)U t . This social gain occurs with probability n in the unit of time, and its expected value is then n(U t+1 U t ). As a result, the overall return from this 'asset' is y t + n(U t+1 U t ), which must be equal to that obtained under the rate r, that is
The social planner, however, holds ambiguous beliefs about the true value of the arrival rate of innovation . Under the MEU decision rule, and by following an argument in all respects analogous to the one elaborated for the case of laissez-faire, equilibrium condition (8) simply becomes y t + [ m + (1 )M ]n(U t+1 U t )] = rU t :
Once substituting for y t = A t (L n) and U t+1 = U t , the condition above can be solved for U t and gives U t = A t (L n) r [ m + (1 )M ]n( 1) :
By maximizing U t with respect to n, we …nd the socially optimal research e¤ort:
The comparison between the optimal laissez-faire research e¤ort and the socially optimal one (that is, n vs. n sp ) reveals that, as in Aghion-Howitt (1992) , the former value can be higher or lower than the latter, and exactly for the same reason. The 'intertemporal spillover e¤ect'and the 'appropriability e¤ect'tend to make the laissezfaire value lower than the socially optimal one, while the 'business stealing e¤ect' operates in the opposite direction: as a result, whether there is under-investment or over-investment in R&D ultimately depends on the speci…c values of the parameters involved.
the labor market conditions of her country. With this caveat in mind, the fact remains true that the causal mechanism highlighted in the model, according to which a fall in the ambiguity aversion index leads to an increase in R&D employment n, is well in accord with the negative correlations between UAI and di¤erent measures of the R&D activity shown in …gures 1-3. 
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